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RETHINKING NORTH AMERICA: WHY NAFTA'S LAISSEZ FAIRE
APPROACH TO INTEGRATION IS FLAWED,
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
STEPHEN ZAMORA*
There is no doubt that European states are much stronger
proponents of international law and institutions than is the
United States. In the European Union, member states have cre-
ated a new legal order that is not quite a state, but more than just
a new legal order in international law. It is a new legal order,
moreover, whose law, in case of conflict with national law, enjoys
supremacy. . . . Such limitations on sovereignty are simply an
inconceivable prospect to most Americans.
The reasons that such limitations on US sovereignty are in-
conceivable to most Americans are many and varied. In some
part they are based on US attitudes of triumphalism, exceptional-
ism, and provincialism.... More fundamentally, they reflect an
historical distrust of power, especially of centralized power. This
distrust of centralized power in the purely U.S. context is even
more pronounced when it comes to power centers outside US
territory.
IN his book The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs,2
John Murphy, whose career this symposium honors, dissects the many
uses (and abuses) of international law that may be attributed to U.S. agen-
cies. His perceptions reflect the education born of fifty years of experi-
ence in international law, as a State Department lawyer, private
practitioner, and legal scholar. Half a century of study and experience
permits someone ofJohn Murphy's caliber to draw our attention to funda-
mental elements of international law and international relations. The
trenchant comment contained in the quote above is a useful opening for
this Essay, which examines the haphazard integration of North America
that is taking place in with little guidance or cooperation by North Ameri-
can governments.
The entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) on January 1, 1994, launched a new era of North American eco-
* Leonard B. Rosenberg Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
I am grateful to Saskia Mehlhorn, Foreign and International Law Librarian at the
University of Houston Law Center, for her invaluable research assistance with this
Essay.
1. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RuLE OF LAw IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRs 354 (2004).
2. See id.
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nomic relations.3 Many Canadians, Mexicans, and U.S. citizens4 would
disagree with the previous sentence as an overly dramatic characterization
of what NAFTA represents. But if we view the creation of a comprehensive
free trade agreement in the context of North American history, the con-
clusion of a (presumably) permanent trilateral agreement to promote the
integration of the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. economies was a major
departure from the past. Diplomatic relations in North America have
been dominated by the bilateral relations between North American states.
When peaceful, these relations have been characterized by apathy; when
conflictive, the United States has used its superior military and economic
power to settle differences.
With NAFTA, the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States formed a limited partnership of sorts. The three countries became
committed to the long-term integration of their economies by dramatically
removing barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and ideas
(intellectual property) across their borders. In geopolitical terms, how-
ever, the commitments made by the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. govern-
ments were extremely limited. While promising to adhere to NAFTA's
rules liberalizing trade and promoting investment, the NAFTA govern-
ments made virtually no meaningful commitments to extend cooperation
beyond that which was barely essential. NAFTA's governments were care-
ful not to create even inchoate trilateral institutions that could mature
into a supranational. NAFTA's scope was broad but shallow-it covers
most of the economic terrain, but it leaves unregulated, or unattended,
the geopolitical dimensions of North America's future.
This view of NAFTA as a partnership limited to economic matters and
insulated from domestic geopolitics is a short-sighted distortion of what
NAFIA represents. Regional trade agreements such as NAFTA have be-
come important intermediate steps in the gradual process of globalization
resulting from the growth of a liberal, open-world economy in the second
half of the twentieth century. Technological advances alone would not
have brought about the dramatic rise in world trade and investment, inter-
national communications and travel, and cross-border exchange of ideas if
the foundation of international economic law regimes (GATT/WTO, IMF,
World Bank, WIPO, etc.) had not been laid to provide the necessary con-
ditions of stability and certainty in international economic affairs. GATT/
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107
Stat. 2057 [hereinafter NAFTA], available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/
view.aspx?conlD=590.
4. The term "U.S. citizen" is less melodious but more accurate than the term
"American," the term used to describe citizens of the United States since our na-
tion's independence. Citizens of other nations of the "Americas"-whether North
or South Americans-can justifiably complain that the United States usurped a
term that applies to them as well as to U.S. citizens. Canadians, Mexicans, and U.S.
citizens are all "North Americans," in fact, because we inhabit the same continent,
although the term norteamericano has often been used as an adjective or noun to
identify a person or thing from the United States.
[Vol. 56: p. 631632
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WTO-sponsored trade liberalization has played an important role in the
dissemination of products and ideas.5
Mexican, Canadian, and U.S. officials saw NAFTA as a strategic re-
sponse to the regional economic groupings that were proliferating in Eu-
rope, Asia, and Latin America, and by the rapid industrialization of China
and other newly industrialized countries (NICs). But in contrast to ambi-
tious regional economic pacts in Europe, the architects of North Ameri-
can integration have been extremely reluctant to foster trilateral
cooperation of any definite character. A widely recognized abhorrence by
North American leaders of supranational (e.g., trilateral) governance con-
tinues to hold sway over what, for a better word, might be called an oxymo-
ron-"NAFTA diplomacy." As Professor Robert Pastor has observed:
The style of NAFTA's governance is laissez-faire, reactive, and le-
galistic: Problems are defined by plaintiffs and settled by litiga-
tion. There is no mechanism for defining problems in a
proactive way or addressing them from a continental
perspective.6
This statement, published before the 2001 World Trade Center trag-
edy, is truer today than when Professor Pastor made it. President George
W. Bush's "War on Terrorism" drove the United States government to pro-
tect our national security by taking unilateral measures, rather than pursu-
ing multilateral cooperation. While President Barack Obama has
expressed the desire to promote multilateral over unilateral solutions, this
expression has not been translated into concrete actions in U.S. diplo-
macy.7 This is particularly the case in North American affairs. Diplomatic
and strategic questions under NAFTA are still dealt with as bilateral, not
trilateral, issues.8 With minor exceptions,9 even bilateral issues are ad-
5. See generally FRANCIS SNYDER, THE EU, THE WTO AND CHINA: LEGAL PLURAL-
ISM AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (2010). "WTO law is a cause as well as
a consequence of globalisation, and it has reinforced aspects of globalisation which
already have a profound impact on EU policy and law." Id. at 153-54.
6. ROBERT A. PASTOR, TOWARD A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY LESSONS FROM
THE OLD WORLD FOR THE NEW 30 (2001).
7. See Barack Obama, Renewing American Leadership, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug.
2007, at 2, 12; see also Ruud Lubbers, Finding Multilateral Solutions: Global Cooperation
in Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 31 HARV. INT'L REv., no. 2, 2009, available at http://
hir.harvard.edu/agriculture/finding-multilateral-solutions. "When discussing the
interconnected economies of the world, Obama has voiced his wish to find multi-
lateral solutions to global problems, therefore giving credence and substance to
the idea of a multipolar world." Id.
8. See How Many Amigos? (Business News Network broadcast Mar. 11, 2011),
available at http://watch.bnn.ca/#clip431956. In this broadcast, Robert Pastor, Di-
rector of the Center for North American Studies at American University, and
Michael Hart, Professor of International Relations and a trade specialist at Ca-
nada's Carleton University, provide an insightful discussion on Canadian-U.S. bi-
lateralism, and the reluctance of government leaders to work trilaterally. See id.
9. The United States and Mexican governments have established a number of
border commissions, with limited funds and modest authority, to address specific
2011] 633
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dressed in an ad hoc manner as they arise-whether through dispute set-
tlement mechanisms available under NAFTA or the WTO-rather than
through formal intergovernmental initiatives designed to achieve lasting
goals.' 0 Political leaders in North America differ over many things, but
there is surprising agreement on this aversion to trilateral, or even bilat-
eral, cooperation in a concerted and organized fashion-let alone "tri-
lateralism," which could be defined as an attempt to establish
supranational agencies. Whether Democrats or Republicans, liberals or
conservatives, PRIistas, PANistas, or PRDistas, political leaders in North
America generally profess opposition to the creation of supranational
structures to guide North America's economic development." At the
same time that Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. government leaders were tak-
ing steps that would lead to an integrated North American economy, for
political reasons they were careful to protest that integration (a worrisome
word, for reasons alluded to John Murphy's quote at the beginning of this
Essay) was not the goal of NAFTA. I will return to this reluctance to ad-
dress integration as a goal of NAFTA at the end of this Essay.
issues such as health, environmental protection, etc. See, e.g., IRA G. CLARK, WATER
IN NEW MEXICO: A HISTORY OF ITS MANAGEMENT AND USE (1987); UNITED STATES-
Mtxico BORDER HEALTH COMMISSION, http://www.borderhealth.org (last visited
Oct. 29, 2011); infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing Border Envi-
ronment Cooperation Commission). A longstanding bi-national commission-the
International Border Commission-was established by Mexico and the United
States to deal with water issues, including issues arising under treaties between the
two countries. States along the U.S.-Mexican border have also established state-
level committees to deal with specific subjects of concern. SeeJulie Blase, State-Level
Foreign Mechanisms Along the U.S.-Mexico Border (2000) (unpublished paper deliv-
ered at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association), availa-
ble at http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/blj01.
Governors of the four U.S. states and six Mexican states that share borders have
also established an annual Border Governors Conference to promote dialogue on
common issues, with reports of the conferences published on the sponsoring
states' websites. See, e.g., XXIX BORDER GOVERNORS CONFERENCE MEXICO-UNITED
STATES, http://www.gobernadoresfronterizos2011.org/ingles/index.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2011).
10. See ROBERT A. PASTOR, THE NORTH AMERICAN IDEA: A VISION OF A CONTI-
NENTAL FUTURE 149 (2011). "Since NAFTA came into effect in January 1994, all
three governments have settled back into the relationships that had existed before,
which was a dual-bilateral relationship-the United States and Canada and the
United States and Mexico." Id.; accord PASTOR, supra note 6.
11. See Book World: Vicente Fox's 'Revolution of Hope', WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2007/11/05/DI2007110501
135.html (transcript of interview with Former Mexican President Vicente Fox).
Former Mexican President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) is a notable exception to the
general opposition to structured North American integration. In a 2007 interview,
President Fox stated: "Why can't we be not only partners in the long term, but a
North American Union?" Id.
634 [Vol. 56: p. 631
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I. ARE INSTITUTIONS NECESSARY To ECONOMIC INTEGRATION?
CONTRASTING NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES
This reluctance to address issues of common concern trilaterally, or
even to address economic issues arising out of NAFTA through a formal
trilateral institution-whether related to or disassociated from NAFTA-
reflects a profound difference between North American integration and
the European model of programmed economic union. The European
Union is a behemoth, as successful in forming institutional structures as it
has been criticized for the growth of a faceless bureaucracy easily identi-
fied with the simple expression "Brussels." As a result, many analysts, in-
cluding Europeans, see the "institutionalization" of Europe as a major
weakness of European integration. The number of institutions and fo-
rums for coordination has grown exponentially, to the extent that the Eu-
ropean Union has even come up with a new word-comitology-to
describe the process by which the EU Commission forms committees to
implement Community legislation.1 2 NAFTA's critics extol the contrast
between North America and Europe, seeing the latter's approach to inte-
gration as inappropriate to the individualistic and competitive nature of
North Americans. Even proponents of greater institutionalization of
North American integration decry the epidemic of supranational
bureaucratization-the name "Brussels" is a short-hand term for bloated
bureaucracy-that has taken place to support EU integration. But NAFTA
errs in the opposite extreme. Robert Pastor notes that "[tihe European
Union established too many supranational institutions; NAFTA made the
opposite mistake of establishing almost none that are serious."' 3
The Cross-Border Trucking Services14 dispute between Mexico and the
United States is a glaring example of the North American bias against co-
ordinated intergovernmental approaches to solve problems connected
with North American integration. NAFTA's architects shared a vision of
North American production of goods in an integrated economy without
barriers to the free movement of goods necessary to create production
networks that would allow NAFTA products to compete effectively in
world markets. Obviously, the free movement of goods must encompass
the most efficient, economical means to transport goods. Transshipment
of goods from one carrier to another at the border is expensive and time-
consuming, and for that reason, the United States agreed in NAFTA to a
gradual opening of its borders to Mexican trucks and truck drivers, to be
accomplished according to a strict timetable that was to open the United
12. See Glossary: Comitology, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation-summa-
ries/glossary/comitology-.en.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
13. See PASTOR, supra note 6, at 60.
14. In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File No. USA-
MEX-98-2008-01 (NAFTA Ch. 20 Arb. Panel 2001), available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/dispute/nafta/english/U98081ae.asp.
2011] 635
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States to Mexican trucks no later than January 1, 2000.15 When the
United States government refused to meet this timetable, Mexico re-
quested the formation of a NAFTA arbitration panel to determine if the
United States had violated its NAFTA obligations.' 6 In 2001, a NAFTA
panel issued its award, holding that the United States had indeed violated
Articles 1202 and 1203 of NAFTA.17 The panel ruled "that the United
States take appropriate steps to bring its practices with respect to cross-
border trucking services and investment into compliance with its obliga-
tions under the applicable provisions of NAFTA."' 8 Unfortunately, that
did not settle the matter. Under political pressure from trade unions and
other groups, with support from Congress, the U.S. government has still
not complied with the panel's ruling. As a result, in 2009, Mexico levied
compensatory duties, increasing tariffs on ninety U.S. product groups, to-
taling approximately $2.4 billion in value.' 9 As of May 2011, the United
States still had not begun compliance with its NAFTA obligations, al-
though the Obama Administration appeared to be slowly moving in that
direction.2 0
The experience with Cross-Border Trucking Services stands in sharp con-
trast with the European experience with road transport. In the 1950s, Eu-
ropean governments began collaborating to rebuild the ground
transportation system that had been destroyed during the Second World
War, establishing in the process international treaties to facilitate move-
ment of trucks between countries.2 1 In 1948, with the encouragement of
15. See NAFTA, supra note 3, Annex I ("Reservations for Existing Measures
and Liberalization Commitments"); id. ("Schedule of the United States" setting
forth reservation with respect to "Land Transportation" resulting in full phase-out
of limitations on cross-border truck services by six years after NAFTA entry into
force, orJanuary 1, 2000).
16. DOT to Continue Current Policy Limiting Mexican Truck Access, 17 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 16 (Jan. 6, 2000), available at http://news.bna.com/itln/ITLNWB/
split.display.adp?fedfid=9913887&vname=itmotallissues&fn=9913887&jd=a0a2q6g
1m4&split=0.
17. See Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01.
18. Id. 1 299.
19. See Mexico to Retaliate for Omnibus Truck Ban; Adminstration Seeks New Bill for
Program, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 370 (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://news.
bna.com/itn/ITLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=1 1670372&vname=itrnotallissues
&fcn=4&wsn=501010000&fn=11670372&split=0 (Department of Transportation
announcing "pilot program" to allow some Mexican trucks to enter United States,
after agreement with Mexico that would reduce Mexican compensatory duties by
50%). See generally Klint W. Alexander & Bryan J. Soukup, Obama's First Trade War:
The US-Mexico Cross-Border Trucking Dispute and the Implications of Strategic Cross-Sector
Retaliation on U.S. Compliance Under NAFIA, 28 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 313 (2010).
20. DOT Announces Three-Year Pilot Program Allowing Mexican Trucks in United
States, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 606 (Apr. 14, 2011), available at http://news.
bna.com/itin/ITLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=20535303&vname=itrnotallissues
&fn=20535303&jd=aOc7h8t5k7&split=0.
21. See, e.g., Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of Goods
by Road, May 19, 1956, 399 U.N.T.S. 190, available at http://wwwjus.uio.no/Im/
un.cmr.road.carriage.contract.convention. 1956/landscape.letter.pdf.
636 [Vol. 56: p. 631
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European governments, road transport industry association in eight Euro-
pean countries created an international organization-the International
Road Transport Union-to promote free movement of trucking services
within Europe.2 2 The Cross-Border Trucking Services dispute under NAFTA
is a clear example of the political and cultural roadblocks that impede
North American integration. U.S. failure to fulfill its obligations under
NAYFA due to political pressure from the U.S. Teamsters Union and
other groups was a step backward in economic integration. It is paradoxi-
cal to create the groundwork for an efficient, integrated economy in
North America-a prime goal of NAFTA-and simultaneously ignore the
many obstacles to the movement of goods across borders between Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. Political realities in the United States have
dictated this result, however. Unfortunately, as the following discussion
makes clear, there is no intergovernmental apparatus available that can
adequately address these obstacles other than litigation and retaliation, as
in Cross-Border Trucking Services. Indeed, after the Cross-Border Trucking Ser-
vices decision, the United States, having lost all three NAFTA government-
to-government disputes under NAFTA Chapter 20,23 has effectively pre-
vented the settlement of disputes involving alleged violations of NAFTA by
failing to appoint panel members in key NAFTA Chapter 20 disputes.
II. NAFTA: THE HEADLESS APPROACH TO REGIONAL
TRADE COOPERATION
If the European Union is a bureaucratic behemoth, NAFTA is the
perfect institutional model for advocates who believe "the less government
the better." A survey of the few institutions formed pursuant to NAFTA
can be quickly accomplished.
A. The NAFTA Commission
The dearth of supranational mechanisms in NAFTA is evident from
the top. NAFTA is governed by a trilateral Commission, comprised of the
trade ministers of the three NAFTA parties, carrying out the policies of
their governments.24 The NAFTA Commission generally meets every
22. See INr'L ROAD TRANSPORT UNION, http://www.iru.org (last visited Oct. 29,
2011); INT'L ROAD TRANSPORT UNION, This Is the IRU 2011 (Jan. 1, 2011), http://
www.iru.org/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=mix-publications/AR1 I.E.pdf.
23. See In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File No.
USA-MEX-98-2008-01 (NAFTA Arb. Panel 2001), available at http://www.sice.oas.
org/dispute/nafta/english/U98081ae.asp; In the Matter of the U.S. Safeguard Ac-
tion Taken on Broom Corn Brooms from Mexico, Secretariat File No. USA-97-
2008-01 (NAFTA Arb. Panel 1998), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/
nafta/english/us97801 a.asp; In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain
U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, Secretariat File No. CDA-95-2008-01 (NAFTA
Arb. Panel 1996), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/nafta/english/
ca95081a.asp. All three Chapter 20 decisions have been unanimous.
24. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 2001.
2011] 637
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year,25 but the meetings are generally lacking in substantive importance,
reflecting the general view in the North American capitals of apathy to-
wards North American integration. 26
B. The NAFTA Secretariat
NAFTA Article 2002 authorizes the NAFTA Commission to establish a
Secretariat, but is careful to specify that each NAFTA Party shall establish
its own "national Section," or office, of the Secretariat, appoint a Secretary
to administer its national Section, and be responsible for the costs of that
Section.27 As a result, the NAFTA Secretariat has three offices, each lo-
cated in the trade ministry of the respective parties, and the staff members
are career trade officials of that Party. The NAFTA Secretariat, then, is a
fiction; far from a supranational organ, it is a loose collection of coordinat-
ing offices in the three countries. Even those offices are deemed wanting:
in the opinion of Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, the NAFTA Secreta-
riat, in fulfilling its role as administrator of the NAFTA dispute settlement
processes, and as supporting agency for NAFTA working groups28 and the
NAFTA Commission, "has insufficient resources to do either job well."29
C. NAFTA's Side Agreements and Related Agencies
The entry into force of NAFTA's environmental side agreement30 and
labor side agreement31 were the result of negotiations conducted by Presi-
dents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton to secure congressional approval
of NAFTA over the opposition of environmentalists and labor unions.3 2
The labor and environment side agreements promote trilateral coopera-
25. Commission Meetings, FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE CAN., http://www.inter-
national.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/celeb
2.aspx?lang=eng (last modified Nov. 1, 2011).
26. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHO-rr, NAFTA REVISITED:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 61 (2005) ("The NAFTA Commission . . . is
neither seen nor heard, aside from a semiannual meeting and joint statement.").
The authors note that with few exceptions, the working groups established under
NAFTA, and operating at the direction of the Commission, "remain weak and
solely advisory." Id.
27. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 2002(1)-(2).
28. See Stephen Zamora, NAFIA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems:
The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 401, 414-17 (1995) (dis-
cussing NAFTA's committees, working groups, and commissions as possible gener-
ators of harmonization).
29. See HUFBAUER & ScHoTT, supra note 26, at 61.
30. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, T.I.A.S. No. 12,516 (1994) [hereinafter NAAEC], available at
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=1226&SiteNodelD=567.
31. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept.
13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993) [hereinafter NAALC], available at http:// www.
naalc.org/naalc/naalc-full-text.htm.
32. See Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues
in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391, 399-402
(1993).
638 [Vol. 56: p. 631
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tion to improve environmental and labor conditions in the territories of
the NAFTA Parties, and to promote compliance with the enforcement of
labor and environmental laws in each country.33 Unlike NAFTA, the envi-
ronmental and labor side agreements have supranational secretariats to
help the governments administer their commitments under the two agree-
ments. The significance of these exceptions, however, is diminished by
the very modest performance of these exceptional NAFTA supranational
efforts for several reasons. First, while the agreements profess to require
that NAFTA Parties enforce their labor 34 and environmental3 5 laws, both
side agreements offer extremely light-handed approaches to ensure that
the Parties meet their obligations. The enforcement mechanisms of both
agreements provide for investigation by the respective Secretariat's citizen
complaints that one of the Parties has failed to enforce its laws, with publi-
cation of the respective Secretariat's findings. Only where there has been
a "persistent pattern of failure" of law enforcement by one of the Parties,
as opposed to individual instances of non-enforcement, can the possibility
of dispute settlement and monetary fines by assessed.3 6 No such persistent
pattern has been found to exist to date under either the labor or environ-
mental side agreement, leading one to question the effectiveness of this
supranational oversight.
The performance of the North American Commission on Environ-
mental Cooperation (CEC) is modestly positive; despite a shortage of
funding and a lack of strong political will, the CEC has carried out numer-
ous cooperative activities to promote environmental conservation, and has
helped publicize individual instances of environmental problems.3 7 The
CEC Secretariat, with headquarters in Montreal, is staffed by qualified en-
vironmental professionals from the three NAFTA countries, and even with
a limited budget, the CEC and its Secretariat have a modest track record
of accomplishments, documented in the CEC's Annual Reports.38 By con-
trast with the CEC, the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC)-the
33. See NAAEC, supra note 30, art. 1 ("Objectives"); NAALC, supra note 31,
art. 1 ("Objectives").
34. See NAALC, supra note 31, art. 3.
35. See NAAEC, supra note 30, art. 5.
36. Compare NAALC, supra note 31, arts. 27-41, with NAAEC, supra note 30,
arts. 22-36.
37. See generally COMMISSION FOR ENVrTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/
Page.asp?PagelD=1115&AA_- SiteLanguagelD=1 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). The in-
formation contained on the Commission's website includes a generally self-critical
assessment of the CEC's performance, noting that forty-three cases of individual
complaints had been addressed by the CEC during the first decade of the Agree-
ment's application. See PIERRE MARC JOHNSON ET AL., TEN YEARS OF NORTH AMERI-
cAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 42-46 (2004), available at http://www.cec.org/
Storage/79/7287 TRAC-Report2004_en.pdf; see also HUFBAUER & ScHorr, supra
note 26, at 178 ("[T]he 'nonenforcement' mechanism contained in ... the
NAAEC is disappointing.")
38. See, e.g., Publications, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION (2011), http:/
/www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=924&SiteNodeID=216.
2011] 639
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supranational mechanism established to administer the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)-has been a dismal failure.
The CLC is governed by a Council of Ministers composed of the cabinet-
level labor minister of each NAFTA government. The CLC's Secretariat,
initially headquartered in Dallas, Texas (a state not known for adamant
protection of labor unions or worker rights), was saddled with political
apathy and disorganization from the outset. In the late 1990s, the CLC
moved its Secretariat to Washington, D.C., presumably to be more con-
nected to corridors of influence. Unlike the work of the CEC Secretariat,
however, the oversight of labor law enforcement under the NAALC is car-
ried out not by CLC Secretariat employees, but rather by National Admin-
istrative Offices (NAOs) located in the labor ministry of each NAFTA
Party. Unfortunately, given the political sensitivity of labor issues, there is
little incentive for labor officials of any NAFTA party to press vigorously
for the enforcement of labor laws by its NAIFTA partners. The result has
been an apathetic and disorganized approach to the CLC's mission. The
CLC Secretariat served primarily to organize conferences and cooperative
activities, but was sufficiently ineffective and lacking in support from the
NAYFA Parties that the Labor ministers from the three NAFTA Parties
closed the Secretariat's offices in 2009, after several years of investigations
into questionable and possibly fraudulent expenditures by Secretariat offi-
cials.3 9 If one consults the website of the CLC today to find "Staff," no
names are listed-all positions are listed as "vacant."40 The website itself is
a graphic demonstration of the ineffectiveness of supranationalism in la-
bor law enforcement under the NAALC; there is relatively little hard infor-
mation, few publications, and only periodic reports.4 1 At a CLC-
sponsored event, I once asked an official of the U.S. Department of Labor
why the Commission for Labor Cooperation and its staff were not more
effective. The official replied that the governments of the NAFTA parties
were not committed to the process of trilateral labor law enforcement. A
former adviser to the CLC has concluded that the lack of commitment
from Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. labor ministers leaves little hope for
39. TequilaJ. Brooks, Prospects and Alternatives for a Decent Employment and Com-
munity Development Agenda in North America: An Institutional Analysis of the North Amer-
ican Commission for Labor Cooperation (Oct. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1752986 (discuss-
ing allegations of improprieties and their aftermath).
40. Secretariat Staff COMMIssION FOR LAB. COOPERATION, http://new.naalc.
org/commission/secretariat/EmployeesStaff.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
41. But see Isabel Studer, Scott Otteman, & Sharon Nuskey, Comm'n for La-
bor Cooperation, Migrant Workers'Rights in North America (2010), available at http:/
/www.naalc.org/UserFiles/File/CLC-Migrant%20Workers%20-%2OEnglish.pdf. A
useful comparative summary of relevant laws in Canada, Mexico, and the United
States, the report is descriptive, rather than critical and analytical, further evidence
of the CLC's care to steer clear of controversy or criticism of the member
governments.
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meaningful cooperation on labor issues through the NAALC and its
structures.42
D. The North American Development Bank and the Border
Environment Cooperation Commission
One other set of supranational agencies can be attributed to NAFTA:
the North American Development Bank (NADB), and its sister agency, the
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC).43 According to
the NADB website, "[t] he North American Development Bank (NADB)
and its sister institution, the Border Environment Cooperation Commis-
sion (BECC), were created under the auspices of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to address environmental issues in the U.S.-
Mexico border region."44 Bilateral rather than trilateral, the Mexican and
U.S. governments created these agencies to address the serious environ-
mental problems that exist along the U.S.-Mexico border, especially in
Mexico. NADB provides grants and concessional loans to finance public
works projects to correct environmental problems 100 kilometers north
and 300 kilometers south of the U.S.-Mexico border. NADB holds 3 bil-
lion dollars in total capital (contributed equally by the United States and
Mexico), which is used to provide funding, in collaboration with other
public and private agencies, for environmental projects that are certified
by the BECC and by NADB itself.45 In their ten-year assessment of
NAFTA, Hufbauer and Schott provide a critical assessment of the opera-
tions carried out by NADB and BECC.4 6 The authors give the agencies a
passing grade, but they point out the inadequacy of NADB financing in
light of major environmental problems along the U.S.-Mexico border,
concluding that the "achievements of NADBank and BECC fall well short
of the aspirations of the environmental community."4 7 Conscious of such
criticism, NADB has attempted to increase its impact, and in 2009, the
bank signed eight loan agreements totaling $211.9 million-a figure al-
most equal to the entire amount of NADB loans concluded since the crea-
tion of the bank fifteen years ago. 4 8
42. See Brooks, supra note 39, at 17.
43. See BORDER ENv'T COOPERATION COMMISSION, http://www.cocef.org (last
visited Oct. 29, 2011). BECC is governed by a bi-national joint Board of Directors,
and has a small staff that works to identify specific projects to improve environmen-
tal protection along the U.S.-Mexican border.
44. Origins, N. Am. DEV. BANK, http://www.nadbank.org/about/origins.asp
(last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
45. See Capitalization, N. Am. DEV. BANK, http://www.nadbank.org/about/cap-
italization.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). Only 15% of NADB's $3 billion in total
capital is actually paid in by the two governments, with the rest being callable capi-
tal-essentially, a guarantee to support NADB borrowing on capital markets, simi-
lar to the method used to fund World Bank loans. See id.
46. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 26, at 173-77, 181-82.
47. Id. at 182.
48. N. Am. Dev. Bank, 2009 Annual Report 3 (2010), availahle at http://www.
nadbank.org/pdfs/pubs/AR%202009%20WEB%2OEng.pdf
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E. The Security and Prosperity Partnership (R.I.P.): The Shadow of
Supranationalism Appears and Disappears
One anomalous experience in NAFTA-related "quasi-supranational-
ism" deserves final mention: the Security and Prosperity Partnership
(SPP), a trilateral initiative intended to increase cooperation among the
NAFTA governments on issues of government regulation and security.
The SPP was created in March 2005, at a summit meeting of NAFTA heads
of state in Waco, Texas. Prime Minister Peter Martin, President Vicente
Fox, and President George W. Bush agreed to create an informal frame-
work that would improve North American competitiveness by creating a
trilateral framework that would allow public and private sector actors to
address barriers to North American integration. The SPP was not a treaty
or signed agreement, and though adopted at the North American Leaders
Summit that has become an annual event, the SPP contained no binding
obligations; rather, it attempted to establish a framework for greater inter-
governmental cooperation, without raising the specter-and, for North
American "nationalists", the fear-of a supranational bureaucracy beyond
the control of national, state, and local governments. A summary of SPP
prepared by the Congressional Research Service describes the SPP in the
following terms:
The primary purpose of the initiative was to improve cooperative
efforts among the three countries in areas related to economic
prosperity and the protection of the environment, the food sup-
ply, and public health. The initial plan included the establish-
ment of a number of security and prosperity working groups in
each of the two categories. [For the U.S. government,] [t]he se-
curity working groups were chaired by the Secretary of Home-
land Security and the prosperity working groups were chaired by
the Secretary of Commerce.4 9
In 2006, in an effort to increase private sector cooperation with the
goals of creating a competitive, integrated economy, government leaders
created the North American Competitiveness Council as an official work-
ing group under the SPP with members from North American corpora-
tions and business groups.50 Other working groups, operating under the
direction of executive branch agencies in the three countries, were di-
rected to improving trade and commerce in North America by liberalizing
Rules of Origin, exchanging information on health and safety, harmoniz-
ing use of symbols on textiles and apparel, and other relatively innocuous
initiatives. 5 1 At the North American Leaders Summit in 2008, the NAFTA
49. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & JENNIFER E. LAKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS22701, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW
AND SELECrED ISSUES (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22701
20100122.pdf.
50. See id. at 3.
51. See id. at 1.
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heads of state stressed the following goal, among others, for the SPP:
"Competitiveness: Work to make regulations more compatible among the
three countries to support integrated supply chains and reduce the cost of
goods traded within North America, particularly within the auto industry.
Strengthen intellectual property rights protection by advancing the Intel-
lectual Property Action Strategy."5 2
Even these innocuous goals and initiatives, issued to little general at-
tention or fanfare, quickly met opposition in Canada, Mexico, and the
United States.55 Bloggers and patriotic groups, especially in the United
States and Canada, condemned the SPP as a backdoor attempt to weaken
national sovereignty by promoting the eventual creation of a North Ameri-
can Union.54 The combination of public opposition and bureaucratic in-
ertia soon led the three NAFTA governments quietly to abandon the SPP
initiative in 2008,55 to the relief of North American patriots and the disap-
pointment of those who favor more, rather than less, intergovernmental
cooperation in North America.56 During its three years of operation, the
SPP generated little significant study.5 7 The brief SPP experience resulted
in little concrete action, while providing evidence of North American op-
position to trilateralism. Since 2008, further North American Leaders
Summits have been convened, but with little effort to overcome NAFTA's
institutional deficiencies. Canada, Mexico, and the United States have
continued to pursue modest intergovernmental efforts to coordinate poli-
52. Id. at 2.
53. See, e.g., Neil Craik & Joseph DiMento, Environmental Cooperation in the
(Partially) Disaggregated State: Lessons from the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 479, 481 (2008) ("The SPP process in both its substance
and form has attracted significant opposition by domestic groups in all three coun-
tries. It is viewed by its critics as proposing a more highly integrated governance
structure that erodes national sovereignty through a process that has privileged
corporate interests and lacks democratic accountability.").
54. See, e.g., Andrew Gavin Marshall, Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America (SPP): Security and Prosperity for Whom?, GLOBALRESEARCH.CA (Mar. 17,
2008), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8375.
55. The SPP website soon displayed the following statement: "This website is
an archive for SPP documents, and will not be updated." (The website,
www.spp.gov, no longer exists.)
56. See, e.g., HUFBAUER & ScHorr, supra note 26, at 488 (putting forth modest
but realistic proposals recognizing North American resistance to supranationalism,
but arguing for institutional reforms and improvements); Council on Foreign Re-
lations, Building a North American Community (2005) available at http://www.cfr.
org/canada/building-north-american-community/p8102 (calling for stronger in-
stitutional structures in NAFTA); Stephen Zamora, A Proposed North American Re-
gional Development Fund: The Next Phase of North American Integration Under NAFTA,
40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 93, 137-38 (2008).
57. See Craik & DiMento, supra note 53; see also Dunniela Kaufman, Does Secur-
ity Trump Trade?, 13 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 619 (2007).
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cies on a bilateral basis,58 continuing the ad hoc approach to regional
issues noted above.59
In short, North America's governments follow a general laissez faire
approach to integration of the economies and societies of the NAFTA
countries. Trilateralism is eschewed in favor of ad hoc attempts at bilat-
eral, generally short-term solutions to issues of common concern to North
Americans. Canada, Mexico, and the United States (especially the last)
prefer to conduct affairs unilaterally, with occasional resort to bilateral ini-
tiatives to smooth over economic or diplomatic problems.
Does it matter that NAFTA lacks intergovernmental institutions to
mediate the effects of economic integration? Isn't the laissez faire pattern
of North American integration preferable to the model followed by the
European Union, where the name "Brussels" conjures up an image of
faceless bureaucrats unresponsive to the citizens they regulate?60 To an-
swer both these questions, one has to consider the price of inaction at an
intergovernmental level. In particular, we must look at the side effects of
NAFTA, how increased economic integration has carried with it social
costs for each NAFTA nation.
III. NAFTA's SIDE EFFECrs AND THE NEED TO MEDIATE
NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION
The trade ministries of the NAFTA Parties have extolled the increased
trade and investment between the three economies since NAFTA's entry
58. On February 4, 2011, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Presi-
dent Barack Obama announced the Declaration on a Shared Vision for Perimeter
Security and Economic Competitiveness. PM and US. President Obama Announce
Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness Between Canada and the
United States, PRIME MINISTER OF CAN. (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/
media.asp?category=1 &featureld=6&pageld=26&id=3931. According to an an-
nouncement by the Canadian government,
The [d]eclaration will focus on four areas of co-operation: address-
ing threats [to national security] early; trade facilitation, economic
growth and jobs; integrated cross-border law enforcement; and critical
infrastructure and cyber-security.
Canada and the U.S. will develop a joint action plan on perimeter
security and economic competitiveness that will set out a range of initia-
tives in the four key areas to improve both countries' ability to manage
security risks, while facilitating the flow of people, goods and services.
Id.
The governments also announced the creation of a bilateral, "imitation SPP" (my
term), entitled the U.S.-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, or RCC, to re-
duce red tape and enhance integration of the two countries. See id.
59. For further discussion of the ad hoc approach to regional issues, see supra
notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
60. See Martijn L.P. Groenleer, Regulatory Governance in the European Union: The
Political Struggle over Committees, Agencies and Networks, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLIT-
IcS OF REGULATION (David Levi-Faur ed.,2011). Groenleer provides a nuanced ap-
proach to European institutionalization and centralization.
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into force,61 at the same time that government leaders have been careful
not to expound on the value of an integrated economy and society in
North America, so as not to stir up opponents of NAFTA who decry the
loss of "sovereignty" that they fear would result from North American
integration.
But the reluctance to stress integration, whether economic, social, or
political, does not mean that the integration of Canada, Mexico, and the
United States is failing to take place, as many observers have remarked.
To the contrary, increased volumes of trade and investment have resulted
in the creation of interconnected marketing networks and cross-border
chains of production connecting the economies of Canada, Mexico, and
the United States more closely than ever before. In a detailed and bal-
anced study of NAFTA's effects during the first decade of its existence,
commentators have noted that NAFTA largely succeeded in its goal of re-
ducing barriers to trade and investment. 62
The expansion of trade and investment under NAFTA has benefited
certain sectors of society in each NAFTA country-especially those individ-
uals capable of investing abroad and workers employed in industries fa-
vored by that investment. But there have been losers as well. 63 Indeed,
the success or failure of NAFTA depends on the eye of the beholder.
NAFTA's benefits will be extolled by those who have profited from in-
creased trade and investment-business owners who have expanded oper-
ations and workers whose jobs have been created by NAFTA-driven
investment. NAFTA's failures will be cited by those who remain mired in
poverty, whether factory workers in the United States, or Mexican farmers
who have fled the countryside because they cannot compete with im-
ports.64 The list of negative side effects of free trade65 are detailed below.
61. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NAFTA POLICY BRIEF:
NAFTA BENEFITS, (2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
NAFTA%20Benefits.pdf (citing growth in trade among NAFTA Parties).
62. See, e.g., HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 26, at 62.
63. SUBSIDIZING INEQUALITY MEXICAN CORN POLIcY SINCE NAFTA 7 (Jonathan
Fox & Libby Haight eds., 2010), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/
default/files/Subsidizing%20Inequality_0.pdf. Mexico lost twenty percent of its
farm jobs between 1991 and 2007. Farm workers have not been absorbed into the
urban economies of Mexico, where unemployment and underemployment are
rampant, but have instead migrated to the United States to seek jobs, adding to the
population of undocumented workers in the United States.
64. See generally Zamora, supra note 56, at 110-19. Real wages in Mexico's agri-
cultural sector have declined since NAFTA entered into force, contributing to the
illegal migration of workers to the United States. See id. at 112.
65. See HUFBAUER & ScHorr, supra note 26, at 10. NAFTA is not just a trade
agreement. It is, instead, a "relationship agreement," solidifying the connections
between the three North American partners. This is true in spite of efforts by the
NAFTA governments to downplay how the NAFTA partnership has geopolitical
implications for the three NAFTA parties. One glaring example of such implica-
tions appeared soon after NAFTA entered into force. Mexico, facing dramatic cap-
ital flight and a run against the peso, was in need of immediate balance of
payments support. President Clinton provided that support, through currency
6452011]
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A. Economic Inequality
NAIFTA's critics argue that NAFTA's gains (increased trade and invest-
ment) have benefitted the select few (wealthy investors, educated workers)
while impoverishing many, especially unskilled workers whose jobs have
been displaced.6 6 As a result, NAFTA has arguably contributed to greater
economic inequality in North America, at least insofar as the United States
and Mexico are concerned.6 7 Since NAFTA entered into force, Gini coef-
ficients show that unequal distribution of wealth has increased in Mex-
ico. 68 In opening their borders to increased trade and investment, the
swaps arranged through the Federal Reserve, without having to resort to congres-
sional action.
66. PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE TEN YEAR TRACK RECORD OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE MEXICAN ECONOMY, AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT
2 (2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTA_10_mexico.pdf
(discussing impact of NAFTA on Mexican Workers).
The vast majority of Mexican workers have not benefited from
NAFTA. Instead, the minimum wage, which approximately 25% of the
country's 40 million workers earn, has declined 20% and hovers at
around $4/day....
NAFTA's export-driven model benefited large multinational corpo-
rations while generally decimating small and medium-sized Mexican busi-
nesses, which not only faced new competition from huge companies
whose Mexican operations enjoyed an array of rights and privileges under
NAFTA, but which also lost benefits from assorted credit programs and
procurement preferences banned by NAFTA.
Id. at 2-3.
67. But see GERARDO ESQUIVEL, THE DYNAMICS OF INCOME INEQUALITY IN MEX-
ICO SINCE NAFTA (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/
Economia/GEsquivel.pdf (completing economic analysis that indicates income in-
equality increased dramatically in Mexico in decade before NAFTA came into
force, but that income inequality has actually declined slightly since mid-1990s,
due in part to increases in wages for skilled workers).
68. See id. at 2. Since the mid-1980s, when Mexico began the process of eco-
nomic opening (aperture econ6mica) that culminated in NAFTA's entry into force,
income distribution in Mexico has become more unequal. The concentration of
income as measured by Gini coefficients (.000 designating perfectly equal distribu-
tion, and 1.000 indicating perfectly unequal distribution) shows that Mexico's in-
come inequality grew steeply in the late 1980s and early 1990s and remains high.
In 2010, the Gini coefficient figures for the NAFTA Parties were the highest (most
unequal) for Mexico (.481), with the United States a healthily unequal second (at
.408), and Canada a moderately equal Party (.326). See Global Peace Index Related
Indicators-2010, VIsION OF HUMANITY, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-
data/#/2010/gini//compare/MX+US+CA (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). By compar-
ison, wealth is more evenly distributed in Europe, as shown by the figures for
France (.327), Germany (.283), Spain (.347), Italy (.36), and the United Kingdom
(.36). See Global Peace Index Related Indicators-2010, VIsION OF HUMANITY, http://
www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2010/gini//compare/FRIE+ES+IT+GB
(last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
The Gini coefficient (developed in 1912 by Italian economist Corrado Gini) is
a measure of income inequality within a society. According to the World Bank, the
Gini coefficient is "the most commonly used measure of inequality. The coeffi-
cient varies between 0, which reflects complete equality and 1, which indicates
complete inequality (one person has all the income or consumption, all others
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NAFTA parties have contributed to the decline of formerly protected in-
dustries (textiles and automotive products in the U.S.; agricultural prod-
ucts and certain manufacturing in Mexico), costing many workers their
jobs; in Mexico, the principal safety net has been migration to the United
States to seek jobs, creating a major political problem in the United States.
B. Unauthorized Immigration
The Pew Hispanic Center calculates that 11.2 million undocumented
persons (unauthorized immigrants) live in the United States,69 and that
6.5 million of these immigrants came from Mexico. 70 NAFTA's propo-
nents hoped that the free trade agreement would spur the Mexican econ-
omy to create more jobs, thus relieving pressure for workers to migrate to
the United States (a traditional "safety valve" for Mexico's under-employed
workforce). As a result, immigration was left off the table during NAFTA
negotiations. Unfortunately, the migration of undocumented workers
from Mexico to the United States increased after NAFTA entered into
force, driven by continued joblessness and worker displacement in Mex-
ico, moderate economic growth in the United States, and the growing net-
work of Mexican families living in the United States.71 Immigration, and
the presence of a large population of Mexican citizens who reside in the
United States and participate fully in the U.S. economy, remains a volatile
issue in U.S.-Mexican relations.
Post-NAFTA, the Canadian and Mexican economies are even more
tied to that of the United States, for better or worse.7 2 Because of its size,
the U.S. economy (almost ten times the size of the Canadian economy,
and fourteen times the size of the Mexican economy) 7 3 is not as depen-
have none)." See Measuring Inequality, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/
3SLYUTVY0O (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
69. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IM-
MIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010 at 1 (2011), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
70. See id. at 2.
71. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & ROBERTO SURO, PEW HISPANIC CTR., RISE, PEAK AND
DECLINE: TRENDS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION 1992-2004, at 10-11 (2005), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/53.pdf.
72. See, e.g., Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Canada: Staff Report for the 2010 Article
IV Consultation, at 9, IMF Country Report No. 10/377 (Nov. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2010/crl0377.pdf ("With the United
States accounting for three-fourths of Canadian exports, a further worsening in
the U.S. outlook could have major implications for Canada's growth (staff esti-
mates that a 1 percentage point drop in U.S. growth reduces Canada's growth by
1/2 to 3/4 of 1 percentage point)."); IMF, Mexico: Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV
Consultation, at 3, IMF Country Report No. 10/71 (March 1, 2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1071.pdf ("With more than 1/4
of exports directed to the U.S. and strong integration of production structures
among the NAFTA countries, the collapse in U.S. industrial production quickly
propagated to Mexico.").
73. See The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html?countryName=
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dent for its economic growth on the performance of our NAFTA partners.
Nevertheless, economic weakness in either country can bring political and
geopolitical consequences that will inevitably impact the United States.
C. Environmental Effects
One negative side effect of free trade-and of economic activity in
general-has to do with the environmental effects of business enterprises,
whether through new investment or continuing activities that have envi-
ronmental impacts. In the case of Mexico, in particular, strains on the
environment abound in a country that combines a weak infrastructure for
environmental protection with a mediocre record of environmental law
enforcement. The NAFTA-related initiatives that were intended to pro-
mote environmental protection in North America, discussed previously,74
have been inadequate to the task of protecting the North American
environment.7 5
D. National Security
As already noted, the NAFTA governments did not stress that there
was a geopolitical dimension to the free trade agreement. Nevertheless, it
is easy to see that the three NAFTA countries are bound by geography to
be concerned about the security and stability of our NAFTA partners. En-
try of proven terrorists into the United States from Canada is well-docu-
mented.7 6 The largest national security concern the region, however,
revolves around the increased violence and the growth of organized crime
in Mexico. The crime wave in Mexico is closely linked to North American
integration, for the reasons that follow.
Corporations-Ford, Apple Computers, Walmart, Home De-
pot-are not the only manufacturing and distribution networks
of a trilateral nature that have grown with the increase in NAFTA
trade and investment. The wave of organized crime in North
America is fueled by illicit drug trafficking carried out through
distribution channels between Mexico and the United States, the
principal drug market in the world.7 7 For many years, the
Mexico&countryCode=mx&regionCode=na&#mx (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). U.S.
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010 was $14.26 trillion; Canadian GDP in 2010
was equivalent to $1.57 trillion; and Mexican GDP in 2010 was equivalent to $1.039
trillion. See id.
74. For further discussion of the NAFTA-related initiatives, see supra notes 30-
48 and accompanying text.
75. See generally HUFBAUER & ScHorr, supra note 26, at 153-83.
76. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ArrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMIs-
SION REPORT 261, 359 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/ful-
Ireport.pdf.
77. SeeJAMEs 0. FINCKENAUER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, NCJ 218561, MEX-
ICO AND THE UNITED STATES: NEIGHBORS CONFRONT DRUG TRAFFICKING 1 (2000),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/218561.pdf.
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United States government has quietly supported the replacement
of single-party government in Mexico by a system of free elec-
tions with power shared by three principal political parties. Un-
fortunately, democracy has also brought greater instability,
through the lack of a majority party in Congress and a weakening
of the Mexican president as a stable (if previously undemocratic)
force to govern Mexico.78
We ignore the geopolitical effects of increased economic integration
in North America at our own peril. The United States is not immune from
the effects of instability or insecurity in Mexico, any more than Canada is
immune from instability or insecurity in the United States. NAFTA has
advanced the process of interdependence by demolishing barriers to trade
and investment, and North America governments and their citizens must
devise ways to manage this interdependence.
The architects of the European Union, striving for a continental
union of countries with even more widely divergent levels of development
than exist in NAFTA, recognized the need to reduce national disparities in
poverty and income levels to promote stable development. To that end,
the EU has followed a general policy of social cohesion, devoting billions
of euros to achieve an approximate convergence of social and economic
indicators.7 9 As I have proposed elsewhere, the NAFTA parties should fol-
low a similar approach by creating a North American Regional Develop-
ment Fund that would commit the NAFTA governments to a policy of
promoting social convergence in North America.80 A North American Re-
gional Development Fund would use funding from all three NAFTA gov-
ernments to promote infrastructure development in economically
depressed regions in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Such a pro-
posal runs counter to our history. The United States has historically pro-
vided scant foreign aid to Mexico, due in part to Mexican reluctance to
adhere to U.S. policies and also to U.S. perceptions that foreign assistance
During FY 2000, 89 million automobiles, 4.5 million trucks, and 293 mil-
lion people entered the U.S. from Mexico. Each of these modes of trans-
portation have been used by drug traffickers to ship their goods across
the border. For example, a tractor-trailer transporting legitimate cargo
may also contain hidden bales of marijuana; a legal immigrant might
carry concealed parcels of heroin through a border checkpoint; or a pas-
senger car may contain bags of cocaine in a tire or other secret
compartments.
Id.
78. See generally Stephen Zamora & Jos6 Ram6n Cossio, Mexican Constitutional-
ism After Presidencialismo, 4 INT'L J. CON. L. 411, 413-18 (2006).
79. See EUROPFAN COMMISSION, Investing in Europe's future: Fifth Report on Eco-
nomic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, at XXIII (Nov. 2010), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion5/pdf/
5cr.en.pdf ("Cohesion policy has made a significant contribution to spreading
growth and prosperity across the Union, while reducing economic, social and terri-
torial disparities.").
80. See generally Zamora, supra note 56.
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was unnecessary because of stability insured by single party rule in Mexico.
With Mexico undergoing a period of destabilization (which coincided
with the arrival of competitive democracy in 2000), the United States has
dramatically increased its foreign aid to Mexico, but most of the funding
has been directed to military and national security funding.8 ' Such a level
of military aid would not be needed, however, if the NAFTA governments
invested with foresight in programs designed to forestall the criminality
and destabilization that occurs under conditions of poverty and poor
education.
IV. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN AN ERA OF DISAGGREGATED STATES AND
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MEDIATING INTEGRATION
The failure of NAFTA's governments to mediate the effects of eco-
nomic integration and globalization is prejudicial to a stable economy and
society in North America. The answer to instability and disruption will not
be found in military measures or in the construction of fences along our
borders, but rather in multilateral cooperation. Dr. Isabel Studer, a Mexi-
can expert in North American affairs, has clearly identified the shortcom-
ings of laissez faire integration in North America:
[T]he three [NAFTA] countries should begin by recognizing
how their failure to act collectively is undermining the potential
benefits accrued from their complementarities and the already
high levels of integration in North America. New forms of coop-
eration and policy coordination are certainly in the realm of the
possible, but the essential ingredients are political leadership and the
kind of collaboration and commitment between the public sector
and the private sector that brought NAFTA to life in the early
1990s. In the absence of these factors, and of a more institution-
alized framework, it is difficult to imagine how the NAFTA coun-
tries can resolve common transnational problems in such
strategic areas as migration and labor disputes, climate changes,
and energy.82
In 2011, there is little reason to hope that the requisite political lead-
ership needed to strengthen NAFTA's institutional deficiencies, will be
forthcoming. If NAFTA's governments will not create trilateral institu-
tions to coordinate policies, can other institutions fill the vacuum?
A hopeful answer to this question can be found in two currents of
international relations theory propounded by international relations
scholars: disaggregation and the rise of organized civil society initiatives.
81. See Mexico, FoREIGNAsSISTANCE.Gov, http://www.foreignassistance.gov/
OU.aspx?OUID=183&FY=2011#ObjAnchor (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
82. Isabel Studer, Obstacles to Integration: NAFTA 's Institutional Weakness, in RE-
QUIEM OR REvIVAL? THE PROMISE OF NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION 53, 71 (Isabel
Studer and Carol Wise eds., 2007) (emphasis added).
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Without pretending to provide a comprehensive overview of these theo-
ries, I will briefly explore the relevance of these two streams of analysis.
A. Disaggregated States and Transgovernmental Networks
Anne-Marie Slaughter, an expert in law and international relations,83
is the best-known proponent of the theory of disaggregated states. Slaugh-
ter and others identify the limitations that national governments face in
dealing with world problems, and the lack of intergovernmental institu-
tions to promote governance in an increasingly interconnected (and con-
fused) world. Slaughter's theories, expounded in numerous writings,84
are generally associated with the concept of disaggregation. In the follow-
ing passage, Murphy describes Slaughter's approach to solving this
"globalization paradox":
We need more government on a global and a regional scale, but
we don't want the centralization of decision-making power and
coercive authority so far from the people actually to be gov-
erned." . . .
Slaughter's new world order would resolve this paradox pri-
marily through a series of "government networks." To a consid-
erable extent these government networks already exist. They
consist of national regulatory agents and agencies, judiciaries,
and legislators who reach out ("network") to their counterparts
in other nation-states . . .. They create their own international
organizations, but these are "not 'inter-state' organizations; they
are not formed by treaty or even executive agreements . . . ."
A key part of Slaughter's analysis is the concept of the "disag-
gregated state," which she describes as "simply the rising need for
and capacity of different domestic government institutions to en-
gage in activities beyond their borders, often with their foreign
counterparts....
The concept of the "disaggregated state" stands in sharp
contrast to the "unitary state, a concept that has long dominated
international legal and political analysis."..... Her core vision of a
disaggregated world order is "a concept of an international order
83. See Anne Marie Slaughter, PRINCETON UNIv., http://www.princeton.edu/
-slaughtr/ (last updated Oct. 24, 2011). Former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton, Anne-Marie Slaughter
served from 2009 to 2011 as Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of
State. See id.
84. See generally ANNE-MARIE SIAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Anne-
Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic
(or, The European Way of Law), in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NA-
TIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (Janne Nijman & Andr6 Nollkaemper eds.,
2007); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40
STAN. J. INT'L L. 283 (2004).
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in which the principal actors are not states, but parts of states;
not international organizations, but parts of international
organizations."8 5
I do not pretend to expound meaningfully on theories of disaggregation;
rather, my purpose is to call attention to the concept of disaggregation
and to the operation of transgovernmental networks as they relate to
North American integration. In fact, Anne-Marie Slaughter has referred
(albeit briefly) to NAFTA in describing how transgovernmental networks
operate: "Within the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),
U.S., Mexican, and Canadian environmental agencies have created an en-
vironmental enforcement network, which has enhanced the effectiveness
of environmental regulation in all three states, particularly in Mexico."8 6
This allusion to the North American Agreement on Environmental Coop-
eration (NAAEC), although overly generous,8 7 correctly identifies the po-
tential importance of transgovernmental networks in NAFTA. One can
only appreciate the importance of these networks by contrasting the
profound lack of contact among governmental agencies in Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States prior to NAFTA.8 8 The NAFTA Agreement cre-
ated numerous trilateral working groups and has led to other initiatives
that permit interaction among executive and legislative agencies in the
three NAFTA countries.8 9 The most successful NAFTA-related network
may be the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC), a committee estab-
lished pursuant to the NAAEC, which has had at least a limited effect in
influencing the Commission on Environmental Cooperation in carrying
out its mandate.9 0
We need a scholarly, comprehensive evaluation of transgovernmental
networks emanating from the "NAFTA exercise"-that is, from the con-
glomeration of cross-border initiatives, public and private, that were
85. JOHN MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: HARD
CHOICES FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY 41-42 (2010) (quoting SLAUGHTER, supra
note 84).
86. Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, supra note 84, at
289; see Craik & DiMento, supra note 53, at 511-12 (noting, with some hyperbole:
"A study on the extent of transgovernmental networks between Canada and the
United States identified at least 240 networks, showing that, even before the SPP,
networked governance was pervasive in North America.").
87. For a more critical evaluation of the Agreement on Environmental Coop-
eration and the Commission that administers it, see supra notes 37-38 and accom-
panying text.
88. See generally Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Le-
gal Systems: The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 401 (1995).
89. See id.
90. See Joint Public Advisory Committee, COMMISSION FOR ENVrTL. COOPERATION,
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=1226&SiteNodelD=208 (last visited Oct. 29,
2011). See generally Eric Dannenmaier, The JPAC at Ten: A Review of the Joint Public
Advisory Committee to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America
(Mar. 21, 2005) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1078362.
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spawned after the negotiation and entry into force of NAFTA, an agree-
ment that formed a partnership among three neighbors that previously
ignored each other.9 1 Without more evidence, the effects of such net-
works to date appear to be limited. As discussed above,92 the most ambi-
tious attempt to establish a network-the creation of the Security and
Prosperity Partnership-ended almost as soon as it started. The NAFTA
governments are capable of directing their agencies to undertake trilateral
studies and initiatives within the scope of their inherent jurisdiction. Nev-
ertheless, there is still a lack of leadership within the NAFTA governments
to compel such a stance.
Additional proof of the limited promotion of transgovernmental net-
works can be seen in the handling of disputes over the enforcement of
NAFTA's rules in Chapter 11, which guarantees the rights of foreign inves-
tors. Rather than establish a tribunal or agency to promote investor rights,
NAFTA created a dispute settlement mechanism based on arbitration by
ad hoc groups of arbitrators appointed pursuant to the rules of ICSID or
UNCITRAL. 93
Public opinion still shows a reluctance of North Americans to favor
any campaign to invest in cross-border projects to assist the process of inte-
gration, as a presumed risk to national sovereignty. I will return to this
point at the end of this Essay.
B. Civil Society Initiatives
The skeletal institutional apparatus of NAFTA and the limited opera-
tion of NAFTA-driven transgovernmental networks lead to the conclusion
that North American economic integration proceeds haphazardly, without
significant efforts to promote cross-border understanding and coopera-
tion that would relieve the pressures caused by societal dislocations (eco-
nomic, political, cultural) that integration brings. This conclusion
ignores, however, the growing importance of private actors in North
American integration. Private actors-corporations, NGOs, universities,
academic associations, professional societies, humanitarian associations,
and more informal groups-are occupied on a daily basis in carrying out
transnational projects that confront the problems related to North Ameri-
can integration. They lack the authority to create dejure regimes to man-
age integration, but they do create de facto foundations for economic and
social cooperation in North America. Grouped under the rubric of trans-
national civil society initiatives, activities by private groups and networks have
91. See Craik & DiMento, supra note 53, at 511-12 (noting with some hyper-
bole: "A study on the extent of transgovernmental networks between Canada and
the United States identified at least 240 networks, showing that, even before the
SPP, networked governance was pervasive in North America.").
92. See supra text accompanying notes 49-59.
93. See NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1115-38; see also NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW
AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACrICE, FUTURE PROSPECrS (Todd Wei-
ler ed., 2004) (discussing NAFTA investor dispute generally).
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drawn the attention of international relations theorists.9 4 Thanks to the
ease of travel and development of communications channels, especially
the Internet, many cross-border civil society initiatives have been under-
taken to help tackle problems associated with North American integration.
- NGO networks. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have
increased in number and importance in North America, and
in recent years NGOs have developed cross-border ties to ad-
vance common interests with groups in other countries. NGOs
span a wide range of subjects, from humanitarian and environ-
mental causes to liberal or conservative political movements.9 5
- Corporate networks. Manufacturing and distribution chains have
expanded dramatically since NAFTA entered into force. U.S.
auto manufacturers, electronics companies, and others have
made use of the NAFTA structure invested heavily in Canada
and Mexico, taking with them cultural and behavioral models
that advance the corporations' goals. Nationalists may be-
moan the effects of multinational enterprise on local cultures,
but the creation of multinational manufacturing, marketing,
and distribution networks will not recede. Trade associations,
such as the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce,9 6 the Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce in Canada,9 7 and the American
Chamber of Commerce in Mexico,9 8 are active in promoting
cross-border initiatives to promote cross-border business. The
extension of cross-border investments by multinational corpo-
rations has also created an opportunity to use the corporate
94. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Social Networks, Civil Society, Democracy, and
Rule of Law: A New Conceptual Framework, in THE POLITICS OF AFFECTIVE RELATIONS:
EAST ASIA AND BEYOND 249 (Hahm Chaihark & Daniel A. Bell eds., 2004) (analyz-
ing civil society initiatives and social networks).
Although there is no single accepted definition or conception of civil so-
ciety even in Western societies, the dominant prevailing conceptions in
the Western literature have emphasized an intermediate space between
the state and the individual populated by voluntary, self-generating,
largely self-supporting social groups independent of the state The growth
of this modem form of civil society is tied to the rise of modern liberal
democracy and capitalism in the West. In this view, civil society is seen as
a force against the state.
Id. at 250-51 (footnote omitted).
95. See, e.g., John Cavanagh et al., Crossborder Organizing Around Alternatives to
Free Trade: Lessons from the NAFTA/FTAA Experience, in GLOBAL CITIZEN AcTION 149
(Michael Edwards & John Gaventa eds., 2001) (discussing a rudimentary network
of U.S.-, Canadian-, and Mexican-based NGOs to provide alternative policies to
NAFTA).
96. U.S.-MEX. CHAMBER OF COM., http://www.usmcoc.org (last visited Oct.
29, 2011).
97. THE AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN CAN., http://www.amchamcanada.ca/in-
dex.php?action=home (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
98. THE Am. CHAMBER OF COM. OF MEX., http://www.amcham.com.mx/cwt/
extemal/wcpages/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
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social responsibility programs to enhance welfare through
their activities in the three NAFTA countries.99
- Professional associations. Lawyers and other professional groups
have formed cross-border associations to promote business
and to educate their members to deal more effectively with
cross-border problems. The U.S.-Mexico Bar Association, for
instance, boasts a network of over 200 U.S. and Mexican law-
yers, who are divided into two dozen committees to develop
cooperative projects.' 0
- Educational institutions. Unlike the European Union, which has
actively promoted exchanges among European universities as
well as cross-border study opportunities for EU university stu-
dents,' North American universities-with some excep-
tions-have been very slow to promote cross border
interaction between universities and students in Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States. Soon after NAFTA entered into
force, the three NAFTA governments promoted a North Amer-
ican student mobility program intended to promote short-
term student exchanges between students in Canadian, Mexi-
can, and U.S. universities. In the United States, this program
has been carried out through the Department of Education's
Program for North American Mobility in Higher Education,
which administers a modest budget of grants that are awarded
competitively, in accordance with the cooperation of Canadian
and Mexican education authorities.10 2 A spinoff organization,
the Consortium for North American Higher Education Collab-
oration (CONAHEC), was founded in 1994 to promote stu-
dent exchanges and other collaborative programs in North
America, and counts 130 institutions of higher education as
99. See generally Tim Baines, Integration of Corporate Social Responsibility Through
International Voluntary Initiatives, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223 (2009) (dis-
cussing promotion of corporate social responsibility).
100. See U.S.-MEX. B. Ass'N, http://usmexicobar.org (last visited Sept. 5,
2011); see also U.S. Mexico Bar Association, MARTINDALE.COM, http://www.martindale.
com/ProfessionalDevelopment/BarAssociations/International/usmba.aspx
(last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
101. See The Erasmus Programme-Studying in Europe and More, EUR'N COMMIS-
SION, http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-leaming-programme/doc80_en.
htm (last updated June 8, 2010). The EU's ERASMUS program has created cross-
border study opportunities for more than 2.2 million EU university students since
its inception in 1987. See id. With a budget of more than 450 million euros per
year, the ERASMUS program links over 4,000 institutions of higher education in
thirty-three European countries. See id.
102. See Program for North American Minority in Higher Education, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fipsenortham/index.html (last modified
June 16, 2011).
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members.' 0 3 The relative lack of cross-border university initia-
tives in North America is discussed further below.104
A comprehensive analysis of the entire range of civil society initiatives
in North America is long overdue, particularly in light of the reluctance of
political leaders in Canada, Mexico, and the United States to commit to
the formation of trilateral or bilateral institutions of any substantial form.
V. LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN USING CIVIL SOCIETY TO SOLVE
TRANSNATIONAL PROBLEMS
Civil society initiatives could be instrumental in helping North Ameri-
can societies to address cross-cultural, political, and legal problems associ-
ated with North American integration-regulatory disjunctures,
unauthorized migration, cross-border criminality, issues of national secur-
ity, etc. The Internet and other networking tools offer new and effective
instruments for civil society organizations to promote cross-border under-
standing. In a thorough study of transnational civil society networks, how-
ever, one author discusses the many challenges (including political and
cultural differences) facing civil society organizations in creating coalitions
that span borders in the Americas. 0 5
In addition, however, there are major distinctions between carrying
out governmental programs, which political leaders can control, and "out-
sourcing" cross-border initiatives to civil society organizations (whether or
not the organizations are funded in part by grants from governmental
agencies). By conceding jurisdiction over problem-solving to civil society
organizations, governments may also lose control over the consequences
of the actions undertaken by private groups. Civil action, using the In-
ternet, and other sophisticated means employed by civil society, can even
lead to radical change, as shown in the "Facebook Revolution" that helped
topple Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak after thirty years.' 06
A glaring example of the limitations on civil society initiatives as effec-
tive means to confront problems stemming from North American integra-
tion can be seen in the migration of undocumented workers from Mexico
to the United States, which has become a major domestic issue in the
United States, as well as a source of tension between the United States and
Mexico. Civil society alone cannot control the flow of undocumented
workers into the United States. As a result, more than 11 million undocu-
mented persons-6.5 million of them from Mexico-reside in the United
103. CONsORTIUM FOR N. AM. HIGHER EDUC. COLLABORATION, http://www.
conahec.org/conahec/indexjsp (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 123-27.
105. See generally MARISA VON BOLow, BUILDING TRANSNATIONAL NETwORKs:
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICS OF TRADE IN THE AMERICAS (2010).
106. See Cecilia Kang & Ian Shapira, Facebook Treads Carefully After Its Vital Role
in Egypt's Anti-Mubarak Protests, WASH. PosT, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/02/AR2011020206107.html.
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States.107 In addition, some civil society initiatives may be more deleteri-
ous than beneficial to a stable North American society: the Minuteman
Project, a U.S. vigilante group formed to counteract illegal immigration in
the face of perceived inaction by federal and state governments, is a dis-
cordant reaction to a very real societal problem.1 08
Anne-Marie Slaughter and others have pointed out that there are
many issues in the world that cannot be dealt with effectively by civil soci-
ety initiatives, but require governmental intervention, either formally or
through transgovernmental networks. As John Murphy has noted:
Slaughter and Burke-White have done us a service by focus-
ing in their article'0 9 on the reality that many of the world's most
severe international problems have their origin in nation-states
and that such states are in the best position to take the actions
necessary to resolve them.110
This statement is clearly applicable to the undocumented migration
of workers in North America: an effective solution to the U.S. immigration
problem will require action and cooperation by both U.S. and Mexican
governments.
While non-governmental groups may be incapable of solving difficult
problems such as immigration, civil society initiatives can be helpful in
directing societies towards solutions, by educating the public, promoting
the research necessary to understand problems that face North American
107. See supra notes 62-63.
108. See generally Peter Yoxall, Comment, The Minuteman Project, Gone in a Min-
ute or Here to Stay? The Origin, History and Future of Citizen Activism on the United
States-Mexico Border, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 517 (2006); MINUrrEMAN PRO-
JEcT, http://minutemanproject.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
109. See Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 84.
110. MURPHY, supra note 85, at 47; accord Kenneth Anderson, Global Govern-
ance: The Problematic Legitimacy Relationship Between Global Civil Society and the United
Nations 35 (Am. Univ., WCL Research Paper Series No. 2008-71, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 265839.
Yet a new and intellectually powerful assortment of scholars-impeccably
liberal internationalists, wedded to global governance, but not at all wed-
ded to the sanctity of global civil society-has already moved beyond the
idea that global governance can or should be sought through global civil
society. They are almost certainly right in viewing the global civil society
movement as an element, but not the most compelling one, in creating
global governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Benedict Kingsbury, and Kal
Raustiala, among others, are all committed to some form of global gov-
ernance, but none suggests that its legitimacy would come about through
global civil society. As Slaughter said flatly, global governance needs
forms of legitimacy that only states, and their agencies, can provide; she
elaborates a form of governance that goes far beyond the idea of robust
multilateralism that this essay has suggested, but one which is distinctly
cool to the idea of genuine legitimacy coming from global civil society.
Kenneth Anderson, "Accountability" as "Legitimacy": Global Governance, Global Civil
Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 884-85 (2011) (footnotes
omitted).
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society, creating forums for exchange of views, and promoting solutions.
For these reasons, civil society groups have long attracted the attention of
governments and intergovernmental organizations interested in promot-
ing cross-border initiatives. The European Union has actively engaged
with civil society in the furtherance of the EU's efforts to create a sustaina-
ble union of disparate countries. In addition to consulting with civil soci-
ety agencies over proposed EU policies, the EU provides grants to
universities and NGOs to promote particular projects. According to infor-
mation supplied by the EU:
The Commission pays direct grants to different beneficiaries,
such as universities and NGOs, in pursuance of EU policies, in
such fields as social affairs, research and development, educa-
tion, environment, consumer protection and external policies.
All EU funding is channelled towards precise objectives and pri-
orities under the various policies, which, in turn are based on
provisions of the Treaties. 1'
During the five years from 2003 to 2007, for instance, the European
Commission awarded civil society organizations over 154 million euros
(approximately $215 million) to fund initiatives considered beneficial to
European society. 112
The United Nations Organization (UNO) has also created initiatives
to pursue associations with businesses and civil society to further the goals
of advancing peace and development. In 2000, the UNO created the
United Nations Global Compact, which has been characterized as
the largest voluntary corporate citizenship initiative in the world,
whose mission is to ensure that business-in partnership with
other societal actors, including Governments, organized labour,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academia-plays
an essential role in achieving the United Nations vision of a more
sustainable and equitable global economy.11 3
Participants agree to advance certain "universal principles" on human
rights, labor standards, environmental protection, and anti-corruption.
The United Nations has made a long-term commitment to this effort by
111. See Civil Society-General Overview, THE EUR'N COMMISSION AND CIv. Soc'v,
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/apgen-en.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
112. See Christine Mahoney & Michael Joseph Beckstrand, Following the Money:
EU Funding of Civil Society Organizations 38 (APSA Toronto Meeting Paper 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1450818 (analyz-
ing database of 1,164 civil society groups that received EU funding from
2003-2007).
113. Thomas Hale, Silent Reform Through the Global Compact, 44 UN CHRONICLE,
no. 1, 2007, available at http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/chronicle/home/
archive/issues2007/essaysilentreformthroughtheglobalcompact; see U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
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creating a permanent Global Compact Office. It is too early to gauge the
effectiveness of this UN initiative to build a public-private partnership. 1 4
VI. CAN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ASSIST THE PROCESS OF
NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION?
Critics will see the UN effort as the creation of another needless and
expensive bureaucracy, but if even partially successful, the UN effort offers
a model for North American efforts to promote sustainable integration of
the continent's economies. Initiatives such as EU cooperation with civil
society and the UN Global Compact are not substitutes for coordinated
governmental action when necessary; however, lacking effective intergov-
ernmental mechanisms, North America's agencies, public as well as pri-
vate, could look to replicate these and other examples of partnering
public and private actors. Indeed, even the ill-fated SPP created by the
NAFTA governments" 5 promoted the idea of private-public partnerships,
through the creation of the North American Competitiveness Council
(NACC), an official SPP working group composed of representatives of
private business interests that was formed to provide advice on North
American economic integration." 6
Governmental support for civil society initiatives and public-private
partnerships designed to soften the effects of globalization and integration
are being fostered on a much more limited basis in North America than in
Europe, but there are examples of successful programs. As noted
above,11 7 in a rare example of trilateral coordination since NAFTA's entry
into force, the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. governments have funded a
student mobility program to cross-border exchanges by university students
in North America. Unfortunately, funding for such programs is extremely
limited. For instance, in 2010, the U.S. government awarded ten grants
for trilateral partnerships of institutions of higher education in the United
States, Canada, and Mexico. The total amount of funding for the four-
114. For a preliminary and non-committal evaluation of the Global Compact,
see Johanna Brinkmann-Braun & Ingo Pies, The Global Compact's Contribution to
Global Governance Revisited (Martin-Luther Universitit Halle-Wittenberg Discussion
Paper No. 2007-10, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract id=1001425. Brinkman-Braun and Pies note:
Today the GC is the world's largest corporate citizenship initiative with
more than 3,000 business participants. Yet this number is dwarfed by the
more than 68,000 transnational corporations in existence, with more
than 800,000 subsidiaries and by millions of small and medium-sized en-
terprises at the national level. In that sense the journey has just begun.
Id. at 10.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 49-59.
116. See VILLARREAL & LAKE, supra note 49, at 3-4 (discussing NACC); N. AM.
COMPETITIVENESS COUNCIL, http://coa.counciloftheamericas.org/group.php?id=
10 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011) (same).
117. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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year grants was less than $2 million, or less than $500,000 per yearI 8-a
figure sharply contrasting with the 450 million euros (approximately $634
million) appropriated by the European Commission to support the ERAS-
MUS program that enables EU university students to study in EU countries
outside their home universities.' 19
As a general policy, the U.S. State Department has begun to recognize
the value of partnering with civil society to promote projects that can im-
prove international relations. In 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
launched an initiative entitled Civil Society 2.0, which deploys federally
funded "technologists" to help civil society organizations improve commu-
nication capacities. The program initially allocated $5 million in grant
funds for pilot programs in the Middle East and North Africa to "bolster
the new media and networking capabilities of civil society organiza-
tions."120 (It is intriguing to consider that some of the participants in the
Tahrir Square "Facebook Revolution" in Egypt may have benefited from
this program.) 1 2 1 Civil Society 2.0 holds annual workshops fostering coop-
eration with civil society organizations; as shown by information on the
Civil Society 2.0 webpage, the State Department initiative has extended to
the Americas. 122
By working in partnership with civil society organizations-NGOs,
universities, and other groups-Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. government
agencies could significantly improve the outcomes for North American in-
tegration. Currently, however, the paltry amount of government funding
for non-military, cross-border initiatives in North America belies the size of
North America's economy and the enormity of the economic and social
problems that accompany North American economic integration. By col-
lectively increasing their funding of cross-border initiatives by civil society
organizations-initiatives designed to bring North American societies
closer together-the NAFTA governments would make an investment that
will pay long-term dividends to promote a stable growth in an integrated
North America. Short-term investments of a remedial nature-military ex-
penditures to help combat lawlessness in Mexico, for instance, or invest-
ments to remedy environmental problems that could have been avoided
118. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FUND FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATION (FIPSE): FY 2010 GRANT AwARDs (2010), available at http://www2.ed.
gov/programs/fipsenortham/northamabstracts201O.pdf.
119. See supra note 101.
120. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, Secretary Clinton Announces Civil
Society 2.0 Initiative to Build Capacity of Grassroots Organizations (Nov. 3, 2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/131234.htm (last visited
Sept. 8, 2011).
121. See Kang & Shapira, supra note 106.
122. For more on Civil Society 2.0, see Civil Society, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/statecraft/cs20/index.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2011); U.S.
Dep't of State, Civil Society 2.0-Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/150607.pdf (beginning at "What is Civil
Society 2.0?").
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with greater trilateral cooperation-could be saved with greater planning
and cooperation by NAFTA's governmental leaders.
VII. THE ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES IN PROMOTING
NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION
A. Student Exchanges
European universities, working with EU officials, have played a signifi-
cant role in promoting the unification of European society. Through its
ERASMUS program of international education, the European Union has
invested heavily in continent-wide collaborative programs by universities to
promote cross-border education as a way to reduce misunderstanding and
promote harmony and social cohesion in Europe. 123 By comparison, uni-
versities in the United States lag far behind their European counterparts
in the number of international study opportunities for our citizens. In the
United States, we view our universities as the gold standard of higher edu-
cation; we believe that we have much to teach the world, a belief that is
borne out by the vast inflow of foreign students who study in U.S. universi-
ties. For instance, according to data compiled by the Institute for Interna-
tional Education, in the 2009-2010 academic year, 690,923 foreign
students were enrolled in U.S. universities, representing 3.6% of the total
19,037,000 students enrolled in U.S. institutions of higher education. 124
By contrast, while the population of U.S. students studying abroad is grow-
ing, the number is still relatively small: in the 2008-2009 academic year,
260,327 U.S. students studied abroad, slightly over 1% of students enrolled
in U.S. universities that year. 125 Europe attracted the largest number of
U.S. students, 141,955 students (55% of the total); that same year, only
7,320 U.S. university students (2.8% of total U.S. students studying abroad
that year) studied in Mexico. Canada is such an insignificant destination
for U.S. students that it is not among the top twenty-five destinations for
foreign study. Furthermore, over half of the studies undertaken by U.S.
students abroad (approximately 55%) are short-term-summer courses,
January term, etc.-while only slightly over 4% of U.S. students spend an
entire academic or calendar year abroad. 126
In sum, few U.S. students are studying in the United States' closest
geographical allies, with whom we share important economic, security,
cultural, and social relationships. The Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. gov-
ernments should improve the environment for cross-border North Ameri-
123. See supra text accompanying note 101.
124. See International Students-Enrollment Trends, INsT. or hNr'L EDUC, http://
www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Stu-
dents/Enrollment-Trends/1948-2010 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
125. See Press Release, Inst. of Int'l Educ., Study Abroad by U.S. Students
Slowed in 2008/09 with More Students Going to Less Traditional Destinations
(Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.iie.org/Who-We-Are/News-and-Events/
Press-Center/Press-Releases/2010/2010-11-15-Open-Doors-US-Study-Abroad.
126. See id.
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can studies by helping to increase the funding for such studies. U.S.
leaders, whether from public or private sector institutions, would be more
capable of dealing effectively with their counterparts in Canada and Mex-
ico if they had taken the opportunity to study our neighbors' societies,
cultures, laws, and history. The same is true for Canadian and Mexican
leaders. A moderate amount of support for networks to promote cross-
border North American studies will also pay dividends, as discussed
below.127
B. Promoting Research on North America
The relative failure of North American universities to emphasize
North American studies and to promote research on North America is as
pronounced as the lack of student exchanges. According to a study pub-
lished in 2007, there are only six centers or programs in the United States
that concentrate specifically on North American studies; paradoxically, the
number of such centers has actually declined since NAFTA came into ef-
fect.12 8 Increased funding from public and private funding agencies is
needed to help improve the climate for North American studies. The au-
thor of the 2007 study notes:
Among the university-based centers and programs in Canada,
Mexico and the U.S., the overwhelming majority (63 overall)
have a Canada or Canada-U.S. focus. Equally represented are the
centers that have a North American studies focus (14) and a
Mexico or U.S.-Mexico emphasis (11). The abundance of Canadian
Studies Centers can be partly attributed to the funding that the Canadian
government provides (out of the 60 programs, 27 were sponsored by the
Canadian embassy).129
The use of the term "abundance" in reference to Canadian Studies
Centers on North America in the quoted text is very relative. Canada's
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), an independent
think-tank based in Waterloo, Ontario, supports research on a broad
range of subjects and geographical focuses.13 0 CIGI has created a website,
the Portal for North America, which serves as a network for linking re-
searchers rather than as a research center per se.13 1 On the other hand,
university-affiliated centers in Canada have not been active in their promo-
tion of trilateral North American studies, which may reflect a bias among
127. See infra text accompanying notes 128-40.
128. See Vassia Gueorguieva, North American Studies Centers: An Overview, 2.2
NORTEAMtRICA 269, 271 (2007), available at http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/
upload/NA-Centers.pdf.
129. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
130. See CENTRE FOR INT'L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, http://www.cigionline.
org (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
131. See PORTAL FOR NORTH AMERICA, http://globalstart.biz/north-america
(last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
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Canadian academics, who tend to focus on bilateral relations with the
United States rather than on trilateral relations.1 3 2 Carleton University's
Centre on North American Politics and Society organizes seminars,' 3 3
while McGill University's North American Studies program, founded in
1968, focuses solely on Canada-U.S. studies and concentrates on under-
graduate studies.1 34
While not plentiful in the United States, centers for research and dia-
logue on North American issues do exist at U.S. universities. The most
prominent centers in the United States are the Center for North Ameri-
can Studies, established in 1994 at American University in Washington,
D.C.,1 35 and the North American Center for Transborder Studies
(NACTS), founded in 2005 at Arizona State University.' 3 6 Both centers
are active and sponsor research, publications, conferences, and public in-
formation on issues related to North American integration. While not lim-
ited to North American issues, the National Law Center for Inter-
American Free Trade, affiliated with the James E. Rogers College of Law at
the University of Arizona, sponsors research related to North American
trade and legal harmonization and maintains a valuable database on Inter-
American law.137
For many years, Mexican universities have also been deficient in em-
phasizing U.S. studies, despite the important linkages between Mexico and
the U.S. economy and society. As Mexico began to open to U.S. invest-
ment and commerce, in 1988, the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de
M6xico (UNAM) recognized the lack of attention to North American stud-
ies and established the Centro de Investigaciones Sobre America del Norte
(CISAN) (Center for North American Research), housed at UNAM's cam-
pus in southern Mexico City.1 3 8 Since its creation, CISAN has grown into
an active center, with a staff of twenty-three resident research fellows and a
large staff of assistants. CISAN promotes research and publishes eco-
nomic, political, social, and cultural studies involving North America.139
132. See supra note 8.
133. See CENTRE ON N. Am. POL. AND Soc'Y, http://www.carleton.ca/nac (last
visited Sept. 8 2011).
134. See North American Studies, McGiLL UNIv., http://www.mcgill.ca/nast (last
updated Jan. 3, 2011).
135. See Center for North American Studies, AM. UNIV., http://www.american.
edu/sis/cnas/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
136. See ASU: N. Am. CENTER FOR TRANSBORDER STUDIEs, http://nacts.asu.edu
(last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
137. See NAT'L L. CENTER FOR INTER-AM. FREE TRADE, http://www.natlaw.com
(last visited Oct. 29, 2011). Founded in the mid-1990s by Professor Boris
Kozolchyk, a noted comparative law scholar, the National Center has undertaken
ambitious projects to promote harmonization of commercial law and practices in
the Americas, including with Canada and Mexico. See id.
138. See UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTONOMA DE Mexico, http://www.cisan.
unam.mx (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
139. See, e.g., LEONARDO CuRzio, LA SECURIDAD NACIONAL EN Mtxico Y LA RE-
LACI6N CON EsTADos UNIDOs (2007).
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In 2008, Mexico's largest private university, the Instituto Tecnol6gico
de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM, commonly referred to as
"Monterrey Tec"), established at its Mexico City campus the Center for
Dialogue and Analysis on North America (Centro de Didlogo y AnAlysis
sobre Am6rica del Norte, CEDAN). 140 CEDAN's director, Dr. Isabel
Studer, is a noted authority on North American relations, with a career
that spans important governmental and academic positions. CEDAN pro-
motes research and organizes conferences and workshops on North Amer-
ican issues, including migration, climate change, security, energy
resources, inequality, and competitiveness.
VIII. PROMOTING DISCOURSE ON NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION: THE
ROLE OF INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSES
For those who fear the waxing of supranational governance and the
waning of national sovereignty, any discussion of integration in North
America-whether economic, social, or political-is threatening. This
aversion to serious dialogue on North American integration reflects histor-
ical attitudes that will not change quickly. 14 1 Laura Spitz, a North Ameri-
can lawyer educated in both her native Canada and in the United
States,14 2 has drawn attention to this lack of dialogue: "Given the potential
significance for democracy, sovereignty, government, and justice in each
of the NAFTA member-states, surprisingly little attention-at least in a rel-
ative sense-has been paid to integration qua integration in North
America."i 43 Spitz provides the following context for discussing
integration:
140. See CENTER FOR DIALOGUE AND ANALYsIS ON N. AM., http://www.cca.
org.mx/lideres/temporales/cedan/website/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2011) (English website); CENTRO DE DIAtoco v ANALIsIs SOBRE AmtRICA DEL
NORTE, http://www.ccm.itesm.mx/cedan (last visited Aug 8, 2011) (last visited
Oct. 29, 2011).
141. See, eg., Jerome R. Corsi, 'Declaration of North American Integration'
Unearthed, WORLDNETDAILY, July 25, 2007, http://www.wnd.com/?pageld=42732.
This article notes:
The endorsement by a major city mayor of a document described as "The
Declaration of North American Integration" represents a long-term effort
by local governments to bypass state and federal governments and work
directly with Mexico and Canada to create agreements that integrate the
continent below the radar screen, charges an activist. Adam Rott, founder
of watchdog blog Oklahoma Corridor Watch, brought to light the document
signed by [Oklahoma City] Mayor Mick Cornett.
Id.
142. See Laura M. Spitz, MILLER THOMSON, http://www.millerthomson.com/
en/our-people/laura-m-spitz (last visited Oct. 29, 2011) (click "complete profile").
Laura Spitz holds a B.A. from the University of British Columbia, an LL.B. from
the University of Toronto, and a Ph.D. in law from Cornell University. A law pro-
fessor at the University of Colorado School of Law, Professor Spitz returned to
private practice in Vancouver in 2010.
143. Laura Spitz, The Evolving Architecture of North American Integration, 80 U.
COLO. L. REv. 735, 751 (2009) (footnote omitted).
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[Wihile 'integration' is a contested term, it must mean-at a
minimum-the process of combining or integrating previously
separate or differently divided groups into a new or larger whole.
In the context of North America, it is marked by simultaneous:
(a) deregulation at the domestic or national level; and (b) in-
creasing formalization, coordination, and institutionalization at
the transnational and international levels. . . . [R]egional inte-
gration might usefully be described as the dynamic development
of political, economic, legal, and cultural (that is, social) systems
and identities, at the regional level, pushing in the direction of new
community loyalties that disrupt historical systems of political, ec-
onomic, legal, and cultural organization.144
Spitz is careful to point out that the economic integration implicit in
NAFTA is not "asocial," but has effects that go far beyond economic out-
comes.14 5 She also argues in favor of a "constructivist" analysis of regional
integration in North America-one that requires an examination of North
American integration through a multi-disciplinary analysis, which requires
us to look beyond "structuralist" analysis limited only to the trade and eco-
nomic effects of NAFTA. She asserts:
[M]ost studies of North American integration assume a rational-
ist and instrumentalist frame. I have argued that constructivist
theory-and, specifically, constructivism's focus on the produc-
tion of discourse as a set of practices that are simultaneously con-
stitutive and reflective-may help point the way toward a theory
that provides for a fuller account of 'North America' as both a
material and symbolic geopolitical identity.146
If I understand Laura Spitz's argument correctly, the failure to pro-
mote a multi-disciplinary, expansive discussion of North American integra-
tion (in Spitz's terminology, dialogue on "integration qua integration") is
doubly limiting: Our aversion to "integration discourse" not only prevents
us from fully understanding the repercussions of NAFTA (and other phe-
nomena) that contribute to the interaction of societies in North America,
but also prejudices our ability to promote the orderly development of a
congruent North American society by promoting collaborative efforts to
confront the negative side effects of economic integration.
In their role as objective centers for the examination and dissemina-
tion of ideas, North America's universities must do more to help overcome
this relative lack of dialogue on integrations. Although they are not com-
monplace, there are some successful models for such enterprises; such ini-
tiatives should be replicated and expanded.
144. Id. at 755-56 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
145. See id. at 758-59.
146. See id. at 791.
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A. Center for North American Studies, American University
(Washington, D. C.)
In 1994, Professor Robert Pastor, a former National Security Adviser
for Latin American and Caribbean affairs at the U.S. State Department,
established the Center for North American Studies to promote academic
inquiry into North American studies. The center's website notes:
Since 1994, trade and investment among Canada, Mexico, and
the United States have tripled, and immigration has soared. Yet,
the three governments have not kept pace with the changes, and
there is a lack of awareness that new approaches are needed to
build a new North America. The Center for North American
Studies was established to educate a new generation of students,
to promote policy debate among the governments and the pub-
lic, and to undertake research on ideas for a continental
future. 147
B. North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS),
Arizona State University
Established in 2005, the NACTS, in addition to sponsoring research,
serves as a network for scholars and public policy analysts. As noted on its
website, NACTS carries out the following activities:
- Researching and publishing reports on specific policy issues
that affect the three countries.
- Managing grants and contracts awarded to ASU and partner
organizations;
- Convening strategic North American- and transborder-related
events;
- Representing ASU in a number of research and other
consortia;
- Promoting ASU at key research- and policy-related events
throughout North America; and
- Hosting and engaging visiting scholars and students from Ca-
nada, the United States and Mexico. 148
C. North American Integration and Development (NAID) Center, UCLA
Soon after the entry into force of NAFTA, the University of California
at Los Angeles (UCLA) created the North American Integration and De-
velopment (NAID) Center to promote interdisciplinary research and to
assist governments and communities achieve sustainable development
147. Center for North American Studies, supra note 135.
148. See ASU: N. AM. CENTER FOR TRANSBORDER STUDIES, supra note 136.
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across borders. 1 4 9 The NAID Center emphasizes U.S.-Mexico integration,
and the NAID website lists a wide range of projects, reports and teaching
activities related to U.S.-Mexico issues.
D. The Consortium for North American Higher Education
Collaboration (CONAHEC)
CONAHEC, anon-profit consortium based at the University of Ari-
zona and supported in part by the U.S. Department of Education's Fund
for the Improvement of Post Secondary Education (FIPSE), has created an
active network of organizations in Canada, Mexico, and the United States
that are interested in North American studies, especially student
exchanges.150
E. Centro de Investigaciones Sobre Amdrica del Norte (CISAN), at Universidad
Nacional Autdnoma de Mixico (UNAM)
With considerable financial support from federal funding of the
UNAM, CISAN appears to undertake an active agenda for dialogue. In
addition to sponsoring independent research, 1 51 CISAN provides a net-
work for communication among academics, and sponsors a wide range of
events and media outlets for discussion of North American issues.152
F. Center for Dialogue and Analysis on North America (CEDAN),
ITESM (Mexico City)
Similar to CISAN, CEDAN at ITESM in Mexico City offers a range of
opportunities for networking and dissemination of information, in addi-
tion to its research agenda.' 5 3
G. CIGI's Portal for North America
In addition to sponsoring research, Canada's CIGI has created a
broad network on North American issues, entitled Portal for North
149. See generally About Us, N. AM. INTEGRATION AND DEV. CENTER, http://www.
naid.ucla.edu/about-us.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). "The NAID Center was
founded in 1995 to conduct interdisciplinary research concerning the economic
integration process between the United States, Mexico and Canada, and to assist
communities and governments with projects and policies for sustainable and equi-
table development across borders." Id.
150. See CONSORTIUM FOR N. AM. HIGHER EDUC. COLLABORATION, supra note
103; supra text accompanying note 103.
151. One might question the validity of "independent research" through a
university program such as CISAN that is funded entirely by the federal govern-
ment. Surprisingly, in recent years, UNAM's research institutes have been permit-
ted considerable (though not complete) latitude to select their research agendas,
and to publish results that may deviate from official government positions.
152. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
153. See CENTER FOR DIALOGUE AND ANALYSIS ON N. AM., supra note 140; North
American Studies, supra note 134.
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America.154 Information on the website indicates that the Portal does not
sponsor activities, but provides the vehicle for interested parties to consult
with one another.
H. North American Forum on Integration (NAFI)
A Canadian initiative founded in 2002, the North American Forum
on Integration (NAFI) is a non-profit organization based in Montreal.
NAFI lists the following objectives on its website:
Making the academic world, the public and decision-makers
aware of the challenges posed by integration between the three
NAFTA countries; Identifying the elements of the North Ameri-
can agenda which would allow the consolidation and reinforce-
ment of the North American region; Favouring the creation of
North American networks to set the basis for a trilateral
dialogue.15 5
NAFI has organized conferences on specific North American issues,
but its most successful initiative to date has been the organization of an-
nual conferences entitled "Triumvirate." At these conferences, which are
based loosely on the "Model United Nations" model,15 6 students from
North American universities convene in a mock parliament called the
"North American Model Legislature," acting as quasi-legislators, lobbyists,
and journalists to address political, economic, and environmental issues.
IX. CONCLUSION
The discussion of NAFI's North American Model Legislature, a rela-
tively insignificant event in the global scheme of things, is a fitting place to
end this Essay. I began with a lament over the non-existence of trilateral
institutional structures, either NAFTA-related or otherwise, that would
help to remediate the negative side effects of post-NAFTA integration in
North America. Reluctance to embrace trilateral cooperation is directly
related to North Americans' opposition to supranational structures that
are seen as threats to national sovereignty and undue limitations on free-
dom of national government control. One of the few NAFTA-related insti-
tutions created to generate trilateral cooperation, the North American
CLC, had such a troubled history that the NAIFTA parties have abandoned
the effort, which had done little to begin with. Even such informal at-
tempts to promote trilateral cooperation have proven too threatening to
the sensibilities of North American leaders as representing inroads into
supranational governance. Thus, the Security and Prosperity Partnership
154. See PORTAL FOR NORTH AMERICA, supra note 131.
155. NAFI TRIuMvIRATE, http://www.fina-nafi.org/eng/fina/presentation.asp
?count=eng (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
156. See NAT'L MODEL U.N., http://www.nmun.org (last visited Oct. 29,
2011).
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was abandoned not long after it was created, and most of the working
groups and commissions created by numerous provisions of NAFTA have
not been active. The general lack of trilateral cooperation could be recti-
fied by promoting what Anne-Marie Slaughter and other scholars have
identified as transgovernmental networks, that is, cooperation by national
government officials who are specialized in common subject areas, who
can interact with their counterparts in other NAFTA countries. Critics of
this approach may complain of the lack of public control over such bu-
reaucratic networks, but the alternative-lack of interaction, communica-
tion, and cooperation among government officials dealing with common
problems-is patently unacceptable.
The best hope for mediating the negative effects of North American
integration may well lie in non-governmental efforts: initiatives carried out
by civil society organizations and networks created by such organizations.
As Anne-Marie Slaughter and others have argued, there are certain issues
that require governmental or intergovernmental attention, rather than
private action. The most prominent such issue has to do with migration of
undocumented workers in North America. Even with such important pub-
lic policy issues as migration, however, civil society organizations can play
constructive roles, by helping to educate the public and to promote dia-
logue on sensitive issues.
Among civil society organizations, North American universities-or-
ganizations with considerable budgets, and with the academic freedom
and mission to help society address important issues-should do more to
foster North American studies and cross-border exchanges among stu-
dents and professors in Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. universities. Even in
the challenging economic conditions of recession and diminished public
budgets, the NAFTA governments must do more to fund research and
teaching on issues of importance to North American integration. Such
public investment, properly targeted, will pay long-term dividends in creat-
ing a more harmonious environment in North America.
Finally, we should stop treating "North American integration" as if it
were a four-letter word. In universities and public spaces, we must begin
to devote more attention and discuss more openly the interrelated issues
surrounding North American integration. Many of the issues being ad-
dressed separately-migration of undocumented workers, environmental
problems, organized crime, and national security-are interconnected.
As a specific proposal to help highlight such discussions, I would offer the
following idea: the NAFTA governments should create a clearinghouse of
information and networking related to North American integration. Simi-
lar clearinghouses or networks do exist,' 5 7 but it would be helpful to have
a central clearinghouse as a starting point for dialogue and research on
North American integration. With funding and an imprimatur from the
157. See supra text accompanying notes 141-56.
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three governments, such a central clearinghouse and website would bene-
fit civil society organizations and others interested in engaging the issues
addressed in this Essay.
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